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Abstract
Subtle primes can influence behavior, often in ways that seem irrational. Anchoring provides
a compelling illustration of this: judgments can be influenced by anchors even when the
anchors are known to be irrelevant and uninformative. In this article we selectively examine
the anchoring literature in order to evaluate a theoretical framework which has been
employed to interpret many social and other priming effects. In this framework, primes are
assumed to have broad effects, influencing a wide range of possible downstream behaviors,
and these influences are largely automatic. The anchoring literature supports neither of these
hypotheses. Anchors have narrow effects on behavior with little transfer across judgments,
these effects can be controlled, and deliberate engagement with the anchor is a prerequisite
for obtaining influences on later judgments. We question whether priming studies reveal
evidence for the sort of automatic and consequential mental processes that are commonly
proposed.
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Can behaviour be influenced by subtle cues in the environment? Can such influences
occur when the cues are in some normative or informational sense irrelevant to the behaviour
in question? And if the answer to these questions is ‘yes’, what are the psychological
mechanisms that mediate these influences? We take it that these questions lie at the heart of
recent debates about ‘social’ and ‘behavior’ priming (henceforth ‘priming’).
Although much of the recent controversy in this field has centred on the reality of
some particularly eye-catching priming effects, the existence of subtle priming effects in
general can hardly be disputed. Whether or not people can be primed to behave more or less
intelligently by thinking about professors or soccer hooligans (Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg, 1998; Shanks et al., 2013) or think differently about their emotional closeness
to their family members after graphing a pair of points close or far apart on paper (Pashler,
Coburn, & Harris, 2012; Williams & Bargh, 2008), no-one seriously doubts that many
behaviors can be subtly influenced. There are over 1,600 articles on Web of Science (WoS)
on the priming of lexical decisions, for instance, where the speed to decide whether a letter
string is a word or not is influenced by a preceding prime event, often the brief presentation
of another letter string. Nor can it be doubted that long-lasting influences can occur. There
are over 2,000 WoS articles on repetition priming, in which some response to the second
presentation of a word, picture or other item is altered as a result of an earlier presentation of
the same item, often a long time (hours or days) previously. A striking illustration (reprinted
in Gregory, 2005) shows a Dalmatian dog in a dappled image. Successful identification of
this dog in the image can induce one-shot learning (priming) and affect perception of the
same image years later.
In that case, why are priming effects so controversial? Why have many investigators
been so unwilling to concede that asking participants to read sentences containing words
related to the concept old age can induce them to walk more slowly down a corridor (Bargh,
Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012)? Of course, one answer
to this question is that behavior priming studies have focused attention on a range of dubious
research practices that probably pervade the whole of psychology. Many priming studies
have been underpowered, employed questionable statistical methods, or are simply
unreplicable (excellent discussions of these issues in relation to experimental psychology
generally can be found in Asendorpf et al., 2013; Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Bertamini &
Munafò, 2012; Francis, 2012; Klein et al., 2012; Kruschke, 2013; Pashler & Harris, 2012;
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Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Schimmack, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2011).
Another possible answer is that whereas standard priming effects such as lexical and
repetition priming seem in some sense to be rational, many other behaviour priming effects
seem distinctly irrational. If one were designing a system for the rapid decoding of letter
strings, then it might make sense for it to be biased by what was perceived a few tens or
hundreds of milliseconds previously. If one were designing a system for identifying hidden
objects, it might make sense to allow it to access and be influenced by memories of similar
objects seen in the past. But how can it be rational for judgments about our emotional
closeness to our family members to be affected by the proximity of a pair of points we have
connected on a sheet of paper, or for our judgments of risk to be influenced by the activation
of romantic thoughts (Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, & Fischer, 2013)? Although it might be
hard to reconcile such findings with rationalistic views of mind and behavior, we do not
believe this provides reasonable grounds for doubting the reality of these priming effects
themselves. In the present article our focus will be on one particular ‘priming’ effect, namely
anchoring, and there is abundant evidence that this effect can often be profoundly irrational.
For example, people’s judgments can be influenced by an anchor even when they have seen
that the anchor was randomly generated (Chapman & Johnson, 2002).
If the seeming irrationality of some priming effects is not a good reason to doubt their
reality, then how else can we explain the persistent doubts that researchers have expressed?
The answer that we explore here is that priming effects have tended to be couched in a
theoretical framework which many researchers find unconvincing and that resistance to the
framework has led to doubts about the experimental findings on which that framework is
based. In brief, priming effects have been taken as evidence for the idea that primes
automatically trigger mental processes, and that this triggering can have widespread
consequences (e.g., Bargh, 2006). For instance, in reviewing the literature, Bargh and Huang
(2009, p. 128) asserted that:
“… this priming research has shown that the mere, passive perception of environmental
events directly triggers higher mental processes in the absence of any involvement by
conscious, intentional processes…”
while Loersch and Payne (2011, p. 235) suggested that:
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“If, for example, people were exposed to words related to the concept of hostility (e.g.,
“hit,” “punch,” ”aggress”), it could reasonably be predicted that they would
subsequently (a) be faster to identify a gun (semantic priming; Meyer & Schvaneveldt,
1971), (b) perceive another individual as more hostile (construal priming; Higgins,
Rholes, & Jones,1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979), behave in a more hostile manner
themselves (behavior priming; Carver, Ganellen, Froming, & Chambers, 1983), and (d)
become motivated to actively seek out an opportunity to aggress against some other
person or object (goal priming; Todorov & Bargh, 2002).”
Thus priming effects are viewed as arising unconsciously and automatically, beyond the
individual’s control, and with wide-ranging consequences on behaviour. By comparison to
typical theoretical models for lexical and repetition priming (Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff,
2004; McNamara, 1992; Tenpenny, 1995), these are striking assertions because decades of
research have raised more questions than answers concerning automatic and unconscious
effects generally (Newell & Shanks, 2014), and a wealth of research in cognitive psychology
has shown that far from being broad in their consequences, primes tend to have very narrow
effects on judgments and behavior.
Anchoring as priming
In the present article we analyse these claims in the context of anchoring. Thus we take as our
domain a priming effect which is both beyond dispute in terms of replicability and which
undoubtedly has all the hallmarks of the sort or irrationality that makes many of the headline
priming effects so eye-catching. We ask whether the evidence supports the idea that anchors
can have automatic and unconscious influences on judgments and whether their effects are
narrow or broad. We assume a relatively broad definition of priming as simply reflecting any
influence on later behavior (be it reports of judgments, impressions, attitudes, choices, or any
other overt and observable act) of prior stimuli or events without deliberate intent to be
influenced by them. Whereas some authors (e.g., Molden, this issue) prefer to include
automaticity in their definition, we regard the question of whether examples of priming are or
are not automatic as an empirical, not a definitional, matter.
A typical anchoring experiment employs a two-step procedure. In the first step
participants are asked whether the target attribute is higher or lower than the anchor and in
the second step they give a numerical estimate of the target attribute. Thus the first step might
involve deciding whether John Kennedy first became president before or after 1962, and the
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second stating in which year he first became president. Anchoring is obtained if the estimate
is drawn towards the anchor. Although anchoring effects might seem at first glance entirely
consistent with deliberative thinking (and indeed it has been argued that anchoring in many
circumstances may be a rational response by the individual to the implied communicative
intent of the experimenter to transmit useful information – see Mussweiler & Strack, 1999),
they are pervasive even in situations where the individual knows that the anchor value is
uninformative, for instance when the person generates it by reading the last two digits of their
social security number (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003). Equally striking is Critcher
and Gilovich’s (2008) demonstration that incidental anchors can bias judgments: they found
that participants’ estimates of how much they would pay for a meal in a restaurant depicted in
a photograph were higher if it was called Studio 97 than Studio 17, even though they were
not explicitly required to think about the restaurant’s name (we return to this study later).
Although our focus on anchoring will inevitably restrict the generality of the
conclusions we can draw, we contend that anchoring serves as a prototypical example of the
sorts of priming effects that have been the subject of so much recent controversy. If priming
is defined as an incidental influence of stimuli or events on subsequent behaviour, then
clearly anchoring is an instance of priming (see Kahneman, 2011). Moreover the significance
of anchoring is probably considerably greater than for some other priming effects. Even if
people think differently about their emotional closeness to their family members after
graphing a pair of points close or far apart on paper (a questionable claim: Pashler et al.,
2012), the wider consequences of such priming would be fairly modest. In contrast, anchors
have been shown to influence buying and selling prices, purchasing decisions, credit card
repayments, negotiation outcomes, jury verdicts, etc. As with repetition priming (Roediger &
McDermott, 1993), anchoring can be long-lasting: anchors can bias judgments made even a
week later (Mussweiler, 2001).
It is fundamental to emphasize that anchoring typically involves much more than
simply priming numbers. First, it involves magnitudes rather than numerical concepts, and
secondly it is often mediated by priming of semantic features of the target object. When, as a
result of some anchoring induction, participants give a larger estimate of the number of
calories in a cheeseburger, this is not simply because a particular number has become more
mentally accessible: they actually conceptualize the cheeseburger as being located at a
different point on the calorie scale. Frederick and Mochon (2012) showed participants a list
of 13 food items in ascending order from least caloric (hard-boiled egg) to most caloric
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(Burger King Whopper with cheese) and asked them to choose the item they judged closest to
400 calories. When participants had previously estimated an average apple’s calories, they
chose a more calorific item from the set. As this example illustrates, anchoring effects occur
even when no numerical estimation is required. They also occur when the anchor is entirely
non-numerical too, and hence when no number processing is involved at all. For example,
LeBoeuf and Shafir (2006) asked participants in one condition to add pennies to an empty
cup, while those in another condition removed pennies from a cup which initially weighed 12
ounces, until the cup weighed the same as another cup they had held and subjectively
weighed earlier and which actually weighed 6 ounces. The starting weight of the cup acted as
an anchor such that final cup weights were larger in the group adjusting downwards from a
high anchor (12 ounces) than in the group adjusting upwards from an empty cup (0 ounces).
In other such physical, non-numerical anchoring studies LeBoeuf and Shafir used lines of
different length or music clips of different loudness as anchors.
Moreover, in many instances anchoring is mediated by selective semantic priming of
the target’s features. A compelling illustration of this was provided by Mussweiler and Strack
(2000). They first asked participants to judge whether the annual mean temperature in
Germany is higher or lower than 20° C. As a result of this standard high anchoring induction,
participants became faster to decide that letter strings like swim and beach are valid words
than frost and winter, while the converse pattern was found for other participants for whom
the anchor was low, 5° C. Thus the anchor changed the way in which participants
conceptualised the target, Germany, selectively making some of its features more accessible
than others. These demonstrations that anchoring extends beyond just the mental accessibility
of numbers are important because if anchoring simply pertained to numerical concepts, one
might legitimately wonder whether it has any implications for priming in general given the
obvious difference between the narrow conceptual representations primed by exposure to
discrete numbers and the broader representations involved in other forms of semantic, trait,
stereotype, goal, or behavior priming.
To what extent is anchoring an automatic process which transfers broadly across a
range of judgments and behaviors? Automaticity is of course a complex concept, but here we
adopt the standard viewpoint (Bargh, 1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006) that it is
characterized by (some or all of) four key features, which in the context of priming are (i)
absence of awareness of the prime, (ii) absence of awareness of the prime’s effect on
behaviour, (iii) uncontrollability of the prime’s influence, and (iv) persistence of the prime’s
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influence even when cognitive resources are diminished. We evaluate anchoring against the
first three of these features. The fourth criterion has not been the subject of much research in
the anchoring literature (though see Footnote 3). To be clear, we do not assume that any one
of these features is more important than the others, nor do we assume that anchoring would
have to meet all of the criteria to be recognized as (at least in some sense) an automatic and
unconscious process.
Processing accounts of anchoring
To set the scene for our assessment of whether anchoring is an automatic process which
transfers broadly, it is important to briefly discuss the range of information processing
accounts of anchoring that have been developed, as a way of introducing key explanatory
constructs. A considerable body of research has explored two general classes of explanation.
In the anchoring-and-adjustment account, which was first proposed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974), individuals are assumed to take the anchor as a reasonable starting point
for their judgment and then move away from it as they retrieve relevant information from
memory. However these adjustments are assumed to be conservative and insufficient. In the
selective accessibility model (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), in contrast, the anchor is assumed
to render anchor-consistent features of the target of judgment accessible via a process of
semantic activation. These activated features then bias subsequent judgments. For example, if
participants in the first step are asked to decide whether a typical Mercedes-Benz car costs
more or less than €40,000, they might access the knowledge that they are usually classified as
luxury cars. When asked in the second step to estimate the cost of a typical Mercedes-Benz
car, participants rely heavily on whatever knowledge is most accessible, and the activated
knowledge (luxury car) therefore plays a larger role in judgment formation than it would if it
had not been activated by the anchor.
A large number of studies (see Chapman & Johnson, 2002) have sought to test these
and other accounts of anchoring. A common viewpoint is that some forms of anchoring are
best explained by anchoring-and-adjustment and others by selective accessibility. For
instance, Kahneman (2011) interprets the former as a System 2 capacity (effortful, slow,
conscious) and the latter as a System 1 capacity (automatic, fast, unconscious), each being
evoked under different circumstances. Similarly, the attitudinal model of Wegener et al.
(2010) distinguishes thoughtful from non-thoughtful routes to anchoring. These models share
Anchoring and priming
8
the assumption that anchoring, at least under some circumstances, can be a non-deliberative,
automatic process. What is the evidence for this key claim?
Subliminal priming
One way of demonstrating that anchoring can occur automatically is to show that anchors
influence judgments even when they are barely attended and are not deliberately processed as
part of the task. Critcher and Gilovich (2008) examined this possibility by asking participants
to make judgments about scenarios that were accompanied by photographs incorporating
incidental anchors. In one experiment, for instance, a fictitious college linebacker, Stan
Fischer, was described alongside a photograph of him wearing a jersey with the number 54
(low anchor) or 94 (high anchor). Despite the fact that participants were not required to make
any explicit judgment about the jersey number (as they would in a conventional anchoring
task) – and indeed may have barely registered it – participants nevertheless judged Fischer
more likely to register a sack in the conference playoff game in the high than in the low
anchor condition.
It is nevertheless possible that at least some participants did think about the jersey
number and that conscious reflection is a prerequisite for anchoring even in situations like
this. A more compelling, though controversial, technique for demonstrating the automaticity
of priming effects is to present the anchor prime subliminally, outside awareness. It is
intriguing that in the wake of a comprehensive methodological debate nearly 30 years ago
(Holender, 1986), subliminal processing was afforded a rather modest role in most theoretical
debates about the causation of behavior. Yet in recent years there has been a wealth of claims
concerning the importance of the unconscious in behavior including some striking reports of
subliminal priming effects, amongst them anchoring. Here we do not attempt to review this
extensive literature. We do, however, briefly comment on the pervasive methodological
problems that plague interpretation of results in this field (Holender, 1986; J. Miller, 2000;
Pratte & Rouder, 2009), and we illustrate these problems with reference to claims about
subliminal influences on anchoring.
Adaval and Wyer (2011) asked particpants to estimate how much they would be
willing to pay for a DVD player or a pair of shoes. Beforehand, prime anchors that were
either low (e.g., HK$112) or high (e.g., HK$9,779) were flashed for 16 msec on the computer
display and masked to render them invisible. Adaval and Wyer found a typical anchoring
effect in that participants were willing to pay more after a high than a low anchor (though the
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effect was only significant for the DVD player question and not for the shoes question). How
did Adaval and Wyer confirm that the anchors were truly invisible? After making their
judgments, participants were shown a further masked prime sequence but this time were
asked ‘to write down whatever they saw after each trial’. Twenty such trials were presented.
No participant reported seeing any of the subliminal primes.
There are substantial problems with the inference that unconscious anchors exerted an
influence on judgments in this study. For instance, the form of awareness check employed by
Adaval and Wyer is susceptible to bias if participants’ confidence about seeing the anchor
prime is low. Even if they can actually see the prime occasionally, they may nonetheless give
a negative report because their judgment is uncertain and they adopt a conservative response
criterion. Bias can easily be reduced or eliminated by employing a procedure in which
participants have to make a forced choice such as ‘was the briefly flashed number HK$112 or
HK$9,779?’
In one of their experiments, Mussweiler and Englich (2005) asked participants to
judge the annual mean temperature in Germany after thinking about this question for 1 min
during which a briefly presented anchor was flashed 10 times. The anchor value was either
high (20) or low (5) and was flashed for 15 msec every 6 sec during the thinking period and
masked by a consonant string. Judgments assimilated towards the anchor value: the
temperature was estimated as higher after a high than after a low anchor. To evaluate whether
the primes were consciously perceived, Mussweiler and Englich used a funnel debriefing in
which a series of more and more specific questions was asked about the priming stage. They
reported that 2/37 participants indicated some awareness whereas the remainder did not.
These 2 participants were excluded from the analysis. Many commentators have noted the
limitations of such recall-based awareness assessments, however (Dawson & Reardon, 1973;
Newell & Shanks, 2014) and have pointed out that their retrospective nature means that they
are evaluating awareness for events that happened some time previously and that low
confidence knowledge may be withheld. We thus need to examine evidence from alternative
and more sensitive awareness checks.
In a further experiment (Study 2), Mussweiler and Englich (2005) used a more
comprehensive awareness check. In this study participants judged the average price of a mid-
sized car while high (30,000) or low (10,000) anchors were flashed during the thinking
period. After making their judgments (which again showed a reliable anchoring effect),
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participants were presented with a prime phase once again but this time were told that briefly
presented numbers were being flashed and were asked to judge whether 10,000 or 30,000 was
the flashed digit string. Ten such prime identification trials were presented. Mussweiler and
Englich found that performance in this test was virtually at chance (50% correct) and
concluded that the primes were indeed invisible.
A prime identification test such as this is methodologically far more sound and
permits stronger inferences than a funnel debriefing or the type of test used by Adaval and
Wyer (2011). It is not susceptible to the complaint that it relies on retrospective recall nor to
the objection that it might be contaminated by response bias: since the test demands a forced
choice between the two anchor values, participants should select the string they saw
regardless of their confidence. But despite these advantages, such a test can still contribute
towards the reporting of false positive subliminal perception results. One reason for this is
that forced-choice tests with few trials are underpowered for detecting what is likely to be
weak awareness. For example, imagine that a participant has a ‘true’ long-run probability of
0.6 to discriminate the high and low anchors. This participant may consciously see enough of
the anchors to show an entirely standard and supraliminal anchoring effect. But with only 10
binary choice trials, there is a high probability (almost .4) that this participant will be mis-
classified by the forced-choice awareness test (that is, will make 5 or fewer correct
identifications and hence be judged to lack any awareness of the prime). This problem
persists even when data are aggregated across participants. A typical statistical test based on
only a small number of binary observations per participant is likely to have only low or
moderate power to reject the hypothesis that discrimination is weakly but truly above chance
(e.g., 0.6) (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Pratte, 2007). To eliminate or at least ameliorate
this problem, the awareness test needs to employ far more than 10 trials (say 50).
Worse still, Pratte and Rouder (2009) have shown that typical forced-choice tests used
to measure awareness in subliminal perception experiments (such as that used by Mussweiler
and Englich) may significantly underestimate conscious perception as a result of task
difficulty. Because tests assessing perception of near-threshold stimuli are very difficult,
participants may lose motivation. In their experiments, Pratte and Rouder maintained
participants’ motivation by intermixing above-threshold and near-threshold stimuli and found
that identification of the near-threshold stimuli increased reliably. Thus brief stimulus
presentations that would have been regarded as subliminal in a conventional awareness test
were found to be supraliminal in a modified test designed to be more closely equated to the
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main priming test in terms of difficulty. Until subliminal priming experiments are able to rule
out such artifacts, their conclusions will remain in doubt. Recent methodological advances
(e.g., Rouder et al., 2007) offer the promise of more clear-cut tests of subliminal perception in
the future.
Even if these subliminal priming experiments fail to provide compelling evidence that
anchoring can occur automatically1, isn’t the type of demonstration provided by Critcher and
Gilovich (that incidental and irrelevant numbers can anchor judgments) sufficient to persuade
us that anchoring can nevertheless occur automatically? It is common to think of automaticity
as a continuum so doesn’t the effect of a jersey number on a judgment establish that
anchoring extends up to the automatic end of this continuum? The problem with this
conclusion is that the effects documented by Critcher and Gilovich were remarkably fragile.
From a Bayesian statistical perspective, the evidence they reported actually provides more
support for the null hypothesis (no anchoring) than for the experimental hypothesis. As
Matthews (2011) has noted, a study with a very large sample size and a test statistic that is
only just significant provides evidence that should, if anything, persuade us more firmly to
believe the null hypothesis. Further studies of incidental anchoring are much needed.
The studies reviewed in this section assess whether the simple presentation of a
number can induce anchoring, and thus employ a ‘basic’ anchoring method that is rather
different from the standard method in which an explicit comparative judgment is made in
relation to the anchor. Basic anchoring effects are extremely fragile though even when some
degree of deliberate processing of the anchor is required, a finding which must cast further
doubt on the subliminal effects discussed above. Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke (1996)
found that numbers influenced judgments if participants had copied 5 pages of these
numbers, not if they had copied only one. Brewer and Chapman (2002) found that even this
effect was weak and restricted to some very specific circumstances. It is certainly not the case
that numbers randomly and incidentally encountered in the environment inevitably induce
anchoring effects.
1 Reitsma-van Rooijen and Daamen (2006) were unable to obtain a subliminal anchoring
effect under normal conditions but did obtain an effect when judgments were made under
time pressure.
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Awareness of the influence of an anchor
Studies employing supposedly-subliminal stimuli seek to evaluate the effect of anchors when
the individual is unaware of the anchor’s presence. A related question, which focuses on a
different criterion for automaticity, is whether individuals show anchoring even when they
are unaware of the influence of the anchor. Even when the anchor is consciously perceived
and processed, as it is in a typical anchoring situation, its influence may not be consciously
registered, and in that case we would have to conclude that anchoring can be an automatic
and unintentional process.
In Wilson et al.’s (1996) study, participants were asked to estimate the number of
physicians in the local phone book after processing an irrelevant numerical anchor, and were
subsequently asked to assess the influence that the anchor had had on their physician
estimates on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (“decreased it a great deal”) to 9 (“increased it a
great deal”). Wilson et al. did not report the group mean estimate on this scale, so it is not
known whether participants on average believed their physician estimates were affected by
the anchor. Wilson et al. did state however that about three-quarters of the participants gave a
rating of 5, labeled “have no effect”, and despite believing there was no influence, these
participants showed a robust anchoring effect. On the other hand, when evaluated across all
participants, estimates of how much they were influenced did correlate significantly with
their physician estimates and as Wilson et al. concluded (p. 393), “the higher people’s
estimates of the number of doctors, the more they believed they were influenced by the
anchor value”. Thus the conclusion of this study is not clear-cut: the average participant
reported an influence of the anchor, while at the same time many participants who reported
that it had no influence on them were affected by the anchor.
In an applied setting, Northcraft and Neale (1987) found that anchors (suggested
listing prices) influenced the pricing decisions that both non-experts (students) and
professional real estate agents made when they spent 20 minutes viewing a residential
property. On a debriefing questionnaire, about half the non-experts reported that they had
given consideration to the anchor in deriving their pricing decisions. Rather fewer (around a
quarter) of the estate agents did so. Thus sizable numbers of participants (especially experts)
did not report an influence of the anchor on their judgments. Interpretation of this pattern is
not straightforward, however. First of all, the experts were rather less (though
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nonsignificantly) affected by the anchor2, so reports of an influence of the anchor correlated
overall with anchoring itself. Secondly, it is possible that the anchoring effect was entirely
borne by those participants who reported incorporating the anchor into their estimates. This
may be unlikely, given how robust anchoring effects tend to be, but future research could
usefully separate anchoring effects in aware and unaware individuals. Thirdly, it is
notoriously difficult to assess awareness exhaustively (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Newell
& Shanks, 2014) and experts may have avoided reporting use of the anchor because of the
situational demands. As Northcraft and Neale (1987, p. 95) themselves put it, “it remains an
open question whether experts’ denial of the use of listing price as a consideration in valuing
property reflects a lack of awareness of their use of listing price as a consideration, or simply
an unwillingness to acknowledge publicly their dependence on an admittedly inappropriate
piece of information”.
One methodological issue that future studies might address is that in order to
accurately report the causal effect of an anchor, participants normatively need to experience
both what their estimates would be with and without the anchor, and of course this is
unfeasible in what is necessarily a between-subjects design in which different groups
receiving different anchors are compared. As Hogarth (2014) has noted, mismatches may
occur between verbal reports about causal influences and the reality of those influences as a
result of experimenters and participants adopting different perspectives on the ‘causal field’.
An experimental participant might deny that an anchor influenced her behavior, whereas an
experimenter able to compare behavior between-subjects in conditions of low or high anchors
might conclude in contrast that there was an influence. Such differences in conceptualization
of the causal field might lead to erroneous conclusions, as the participant is surely right that
(from her perspective) she only experienced one value of the anchor and therefore does not
have the evidence necessary to assign it a causal role.
Can the influence of anchors be intentionally avoided?
We argue that it is a misconception to view priming effects as low-level, unconscious, and
automatic. A powerful reason why early studies of anchoring have been taken as providing
some encouragement to this viewpoint is that they appeared to show that people find it very
2 Combining all 4 pricing estimates participants made in Experiment 2, the lowest and highest
anchors induced a 12% influence on experts’ estimates, while the effect was more than twice
as large, 27%, in the non-experts.
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hard to avoid being influenced by anchors. Of course, if subliminal anchoring can occur, or if
anchors can bias judgments even when individuals are unaware of this influence, then it
would follow that anchoring effects cannot always be avoided: if you don’t believe the
anchor has affected you, then there is subjectively no influence that you believe needs
avoiding. Yet the preceding sections have highlighted that the evidence for these effects is
rather weak. The controllability of the influence of anchors thus relates to a different aspect
of the standard multi-faceted conception of automaticity.
Early studies examining avoidance more directly revealed that the bias is
undiminished by forewarning participants about the potential influence of anchors (Wilson et
al., 1996) and that increased motivation to be accurate (induced for instance by financial
incentives) is usually ineffective (see Chapman & Johnson, 2002). But more recently it has
become apparent that considerable control can be exerted over the bias, at variance with the
automaticity view. Epley and Gilovich (2005) showed that the effect of self-generated
anchors was influenced by financial incentives. For instance, when participants are asked to
estimate the freezing point of vodka, they tend to generate the freezing point of water (0°C)
and use this as an anchor, an effect that was attenuated by an explicit incentive designed to
encourage participants to think more deeply.
Although this result suggests that the proposed automaticity of anchoring has been
overstated, Epley and Gilovich also found that incentives had no effect on the size of the bias
induced by externally-generated anchors. Thus in a standard situation in which participants
first judged whether Mt Everest is higher than 45,500 feet and then judged its height, the
influence of the anchor was unaffected by incentives. Epley and Gilovich proposed that there
are multiple (or at least two) forms of anchoring bias, one of which depends on controlled
deliberate thought (self-generated anchors) and one of which depends on automatic semantic
priming (externally-generated anchors), but even this viewpoint may overstate the role of
automatic processes. Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson (2010) found that they could attenuate
both forms of anchoring with incentives for accuracy. Their key insight was that even if
participants are highly motivated and have the deliberative capacity to overcome an anchor’s
influence, they may have little ability to do so if they are uncertain about which way to adjust
from the anchor. Imagine that you are asked to estimate the year in which the actor Jack
Nicholson was born (the correct answer is 1937) and are given 1945 as an anchor. In other
words, you first decide whether he was born before or after 1945, and then estimate the
correct year. Under conditions of high motivation you are aware that you need to adjust
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sufficiently from the anchor but the problem is that you don’t know whether the anchor is
pulling your estimate up or down. You don’t know what your estimate would have been
counterfactually in the absence of the anchor, and hence do not know whether the 1945
anchor is pulling a low counterfactual estimate upwards or a high counterfactual estimate
downwards. If you believe that the anchor is pulling your estimate upwards, then you will
adjust downwards. If you believe that the anchor is pulling your estimate downwards, then
you will adjust upwards. But one of these influences will result in a greater, not weaker,
influence of the anchor on your answer. It is easy to see that by aggregating across items for
some of which the motivated adjustment is in the correct direction and for some of which it is
in the incorrect direction, a null effect of motivation can be obtained.
Simmons et al. tested this account in a number of ways. For example, they showed
that motivation does reduce the anchoring effect when the anchor value is implausible (such
as a date of 1977 for Jack Nicholson’s birth). Under such circumstances, where the anchor
value is so extreme that it can immediately be recognized as being too high, participants were
unlikely to be in any doubt about the required direction of adjustment.
The fact that the influence of an anchor on judgments can be attenuated under
conditions of heightened motivation (through financial incentives) speaks directly against the
hypothesis that anchors affect judgments automatically. Rather, the anchor is one piece of
evidence taken into account in the individual’s deliberative thinking. Further support for this
alternative viewpoint comes from two sources. First, Epley and Gilovich (2006) found that
overcoming the effects of self-generated anchors was impaired under conditions of cognitive
load. Thus deliberative System 2 capacity is required by whatever process attenuates
anchoring3. Secondly, it has been demonstrated that the effects of anchors can be diluted by
adopting deliberative reasoning strategies such as ‘consider the opposite’. As Larrick (2004)
notes this strategy simply amounts to asking oneself, “What are some of the reasons that my
initial judgment might be wrong?” Mussweiler, Strack, and Pfeiffer (2000) provide an
experimental example of the strategy in the context of anchoring by demonstrating that the
magnitude of the anchoring effect can be reduced simply by asking people to list anchor-
inconsistent arguments. Mussweiler et al. presented car experts with an actual car and an
3 As with the Epley and Gilovich (2005) work on incentives, Epley and Gilovich (2006)
found that cognitive load did not affect anchoring with externally-provided anchors. But
Simmons et al.’s (2010) results suggest that this latter failure again may be an artefact of
uncertainty about the required direction of adjustment. The same point applies to results
reported by Blankenship et al. (2008).
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anchor estimate, either high (5000 German Marks) or low (2800 German Marks). Following
the standard procedure in anchoring experiments, the expert first decided whether the anchor
was too high or too low, and then provided his own estimate. The novel manipulation was
that before providing an estimate, some of the experts were instructed to consider possible
reasons why the anchor value might be inappropriate. The results indicated a clear effect of
this manipulation: when the experts were instructed to generate anchor-inconsistent
arguments the anchoring effect was attenuated. For example, experts provided a mean
estimate of 3563 German Marks when given the high anchor and not asked to generate
opposite arguments, compared to an estimate of only 3130 German Marks when required to
generate anchor-inconsistent arguments beforehand.
A related question is whether anchoring effects can be attenuated in experts who have
knowledge of the judgment domain, as compared to non-experts who do not. If deliberative
processes such as intentional memory retrieval play a role, then an expert who knows a great
deal about German cars ought to be able to dilute the effect of an anchor by accessing
relevant knowledge. Conversely, if anchoring is as strong in experts as in non-experts, this
would imply that it is driven by automatic (System 1) processes. Just as with studies on
incentives, several early reports (e.g., Northcraft & Neale, 1987; but see footnote 2)
suggested no effect of knowledge level, but more recent research challenges this conclusion.
Smith, Windschitl, and Bruchmann (2013) reported 4 studies in each of which anchoring was
attenuated (though not eliminated) in individuals with greater expertise. For example, when
asked the questions “How many US states are west of the Mississippi River?” and “How
many states in India have a population of more than 25 million people?”, anchoring was
weaker in US participants for the question about the US and weaker in Indian participants for
the question about India.
Plainly, much if not all of the influence of an anchor is mediated by deliberative
thinking. We acknowledge the possibility that anchoring effects are not completely
controllable and that there may in principle be residual effects that are immune to deliberative
processes. It must remain an important question for future research whether or not
unequivocal evidence for this can be obtained (see Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006, for
a striking example).
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Breadth of transfer
As the quotation from Loersch and Payne (2011) above highlights, a common assertion in the
priming field is that a prime can have a broad influence on behavior. If true, this would be a
striking finding and would require an account of priming which is very different from the
sorts of explanations typically put forward to explain effects such as repetition and lexical
priming. These effects are usually assumed to arise from some process in which specific
perceptual or semantic features of the prime are activated and can influence responses to a
target to the extent that the target shares those features. Lexical decision and repetition
priming effects tend to be extremely narrow in the extent to which they show transfer. What
gets activated in most situations is a specific representation that is stimulus- and response-
bound. For instance, making a man-made (yes/no) judgment of a visual object in the first
stage does not prime making a bigger-than-a-shoe-box (yes/no) decision in the test (Horner &
Henson, 2009), and other research shows that almost any change in the processing engaged
by the target relative to that engaged by the prime dilutes the magnitude of repetition priming
(Franks, Bilbrey, Lien, & McNamara, 2000). A large literature documents the dilution of
cross-modal compared to intra-modal priming: whereas responding to the written word knife
will typically be primed by reading the word previously, this influence will typically be much
reduced or even absent if the prime (knife) is heard rather than read (Roediger & McDermott,
1993).
This narrowness of transfer applies to many instances of anchoring as well. Frederick
and Mochon (2012) reported that while judging the weight of a raccoon or a whale in pounds
influenced later estimates of the weight of a giraffe in pounds, no such anchoring influence
was obtained when the weight of the raccoon was estimated on a 7-point heaviness scale or if
the weight of the whale was estimated in tons. Frederick and Mochon concluded that
anchoring effects only occur on the specific scale on which the object has been judged and
not on other scales, even if they are related such as weight in pounds and weight in tons. They
explained this narrowness by a scale distortion mechanism in which the initial decision
concerning the anchor distorts the psychological scale and hence biases the subsequent
judgment. A similar failure to find transfer across scales were reported by Chapman and
Johnson (1994) who found that dollar anchors did not influence life-expectancy estimates.
Even more strikingly, anchoring effects can be very narrow even within the same
judgment dimension. Strack and Mussweiler (1997) found that asking participants to make a
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comparative judgment with respect to one attribute of an object (such as the height of the
Brandenburg Gate) had little effect on their absolute judgments of this object with respect to
a different attribute (e.g., the width of the Brandenburg Gate), even though both are on the
same scale.
Adaval and Wyer (2011), in the study discussed previously, reported a somewhat
more nuanced (and complex) pattern of transfer across attributes. In an experiment using
supraliminal price anchors, participants were asked to judge whether the average price of an
electronics product (e.g., a DVD player) or an article of clothing (e.g., running shoes) was
higher or lower than a high (or low) price anchor. The product category (clothing/electronic)
and the anchors (high/low) were both manipulated between subjects. Participants were then
asked a willingness-to-pay (WTP) judgment about a target product which was the same,
related or unrelated to the product about which they had made the original anchor judgement.
The results revealed an asymmetry whereby anchoring on an electronics product led to raised
WTP for the same target item, but had no effect on related (i.e., another electronics product)
or unrelated (i.e., an article of clothing) products. In contrast, anchoring on an item of
clothing led to higher (lower) WTP for all three target types (same piece of clothing, another
clothing item, and an electronics product) as a function of the originally presented price
anchor value.
Adaval and Wyer (2011) suggest that this asymmetric transfer arises because
electronics products tend to be evaluated on the basis of product-specific features (e.g., laser
quality in a DVD player), whereas clothing is evaluated on the basis of more generic
attributes such as style, attractiveness, etc. Thus comparing the price of a piece of clothing
with a high or low anchor value will ‘prime’ price estimates for electronics products because
the generic activated attributes will readily transfer across product categories. However,
thinking about prices of electronics products will not prime estimates for clothes because the
specific activated attributes are largely inapplicable to clothing.
While there might be some limitations to this account – for example, presumably
brand status is an activated attribute in both clothing and electronics price comparisons – the
findings nonetheless highlight the relatively narrow nature of transfer. It is clearly not the
case here that activation of the concept “high (low) value” via a price anchor has general
effects on downstream behaviour. Rather, the activated attributes have a specific or selective
(cf. Strack & Forster, 1995) influence on particular subsequent judgments.
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In contrast to these examples of relatively narrow transfer, Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf,
and Brewer (2008) reported four experiments in which they found a variety of much broader
cross-modal anchoring effects. How compelling is their evidence? In their first experiment
Oppenheimer et al. gave participants a piece of paper with either three short (1 inch) or three
long (3.5 inches) lines and asked them to copy the lines (without using a ruler). In a
subsequent (apparently unrelated task) they were then asked to estimate the length of the
Mississippi River in miles. Surprisingly, participants who had drawn the short lines estimated
on average that the river was shorter (M=720 miles) than those who had drawn long lines
(M=1224 miles) (the correct answer is 2320 miles). Even more surprisingly, in a follow up
experiment (Exp. 2) participants primed with the longer lines estimated the average
temperature in Hawaii in July to be higher (M=87.5F) than those primed with short lines
(M=84.0F). Oppenheimer et al. explained these results by arguing that the line-drawing task
primed or activated a general notion of magnitude (largeness or smallness) that then
transferred to subsequently encountered stimuli and questions. They say (p.15):
“We propose that large or small anchors may prime the notion of their general
magnitudes (e.g., “largeness” or “smallness”) and that the activated sense of magnitude
may be influential when judges next form an estimate, leading to an anchoring effect.
That is, merely activating a sense of size, unattached even to a rating scale, may bias
subsequent judgments to be consistent with that activated size, regardless of the
modality of judgment. Hence, cross-modal effects of anchors may arise, with a large
anchor in any one modality leading to a large judgment in any other (or the same)
modality.
Thus we see again the claim that primes can activate very general concepts which can have
multiple and widespread downstream effects on behaviour. Further evidence for this
viewpoint came from their final study in which drawing longer lines led participants to be
more likely to complete the word fragments B_G, _ONG, and _ALL with their magnitude-
related-synonyms (BIG, LONG, and TALL) than if they had drawn shorter lines.
Oppenheimer et al.’s (2008) explanation of their results bears a striking similarity to
those offered in other examples of behaviour priming. The activation of a concept (e.g.,
‘largeness’) is observed to have widespread consequences for judgments about stimuli across
scales, domains, and modalities. Moreover, although the effects were not automatic –
attention had to be drawn to the anchors initially – they did appear to be unintentional
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because participants did not have to be asked to draw explicit comparisons between line-
lengths and the quantities to-be-estimated for the effects to obtain.
It is not easy to reconcile these examples of broad transfer across modality with the
much narrower, within-modality (and scale) effects reviewed earlier. Why in the line-length
examples does a transferable general notion of ‘largeness’ or ‘smallness’ become activated,
when in other arguably more plausible situations (such as the Brandenburg gate, or whale-
weight examples) it does not?
The results raise important questions about the boundary conditions of such transfer
effects. For example, would line-drawing also transfer to estimates about weights and sizes of
objects? Frederick and Mochon’s (2012) account suggests that it would not whereas
Oppenheimer et al. have to predict that it would. Is it possible to obtain bi-directional cross-
modal priming – such that estimating a numeric quantity would influence a physical task?
Oppenheimer et al. tested the latter prediction in a follow-up experiment briefly reported in
their general discussion. Participants answered a question about the length of the Mississippi
River anchored with either a short (15 miles) or long (4800 miles) anchor and were then
asked to draw a toothpick. Oppenheimer et al. argued that the mean lengths of 2.19 in (long
anchor) and 2.08 in (short anchor) of the sketched toothpicks provide suggestive evidence in
support of a bi-directional transfer effect, and thus evidence of a general magnitude priming
mechanism. However, with an N of 82 and a reported t-value of 1.7 in that study, the
evidence, in fact, weakly favours the null hypothesis under a Bayesian analysis (cf.
Matthews, 2011)4.
The reason for dwelling on the Oppenheimer et al. study is that it represents an
important challenge to the notion that anchoring effects are typically narrow. The narrowness
argument is crucial to many researchers’ resistance of the theoretical framework
underpinning priming, and thus if anchoring effects can indeed cross modalities and scales
then the types of transfer highlighted in the Loersch and Payne quotation seem less
controversial. However, as far as we can tell the Oppenheimer et al. study is an outlier in the
anchoring literature. The effects in each of their studies, although reliable, were small (as the
4 The effect Oppenheimer et al. obtained in their Experiment 2, where lines of different
lengths affected estimates of the average temperature in Hawaii, is also judged by a Bayesian
t-test to be inconclusive.
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authors freely admit, e.g., p. 22) and thus would benefit from replication; likewise many of
the predictions of their general activation account await much needed empirical testing.
Anchoring as an example of a situated inference?
Our review5 suggests that (1) subliminal or incidental effects of anchors are difficult
to confirm and/or rather fragile; (2) anchoring effects can be intentionally avoided when
(additional) deliberative thinking is encouraged, and (3) anchors tend to result in the
activation of specific rather than general features (i.e., narrow transfer appears to be the
norm). This pattern of effects seems readily reconcilable with widely-held views about the
nature of priming in other domains and it can also be accommodated by at least some popular
models of priming.
Consider the situated-inference model of Loersch and Payne (2011), developed in an
attempt to explain the diverse impacts primes are claimed to have on a range of downstream
behaviors (e.g., the hostility prime described in the quote above). The emphasis in their model
is on a person’s ability to assess the content of their own thoughts and to determine the
relevance of these thoughts for the task at a hand. For example, they write (p.215):
“… the situated-inference model predicts that metacognitive judgments about the
meaning and validity of thoughts are critical… If one’s thoughts are viewed as
invalid, nondiagnostic, or otherwise inappropriate for use in the inference process,
then priming will have no effect on subsequent judgment, behavior, or motivation.”
Such a view seems to fit well with the effects of anchoring reviewed here. Firstly, when
participants are sufficiently incentivized, or induced to think differently, non-diagnostic
information is discounted (Larrick, 2004; Simmons, et al. 2010). There is no automatic effect
of accessible thoughts on behaviour: instead, thoughts are only instrumental if they are
interpreted as valid reasons for behaviour. Second, in situations involving broader transfer,
information that could be activated is, presumably, either assessed as inappropriate or does
not enter into consideration because of the distance between the prime and the target. The
attribution process at the heart of the model is likely to be highly sensitive to implausible
influences of a prime, in the same way that attributions of fluent processing are known to be
constrained (J. K. Miller, Lloyd, & Westerman, 2008).
5 Notwithstanding the admittedly selective nature of our review, we think these conclusions
are representative of the wider anchoring literature.
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A similar notion is discussed by Klatzky and Creswell (2014) in their application of
an intersensory interaction model to the priming literature. In essence, Klatzky and Creswell
argue that priming effects might result from competition between multiple mechanisms –
memory retrieval, associative chaining, heuristic inference – all of which “bid” to influence
an outcome. The model explains when and why different types of priming are observed by
assuming that these mechanisms are subject to different sources of variability (e.g., cognitive
control, semantic context, cue reliability) that can affect the strength of each bid. For
example, the influence of an elderly prime on walking speed might have differential effects
on US and European participants because of culturally-bound differences in the assessed
potency, reliability, and weight assigned to old-age stereotypes (e.g., the extent to which old
age connotes energy depletion in the two cultures). Klatzky and Creswell sum up their
approach by arguing that their model suggests
“…that priming should be promoted or discounted, according to whether factors
present in the experimental context facilitate or impede access to mediators and
heuristics or suggest that indirect sources of information are more or less reliable”
(p.56).
The similarity with the situated-inference model is clear and the ability of both models to
accommodate the anchoring effects we have reviewed is readily apparent.
Conclusion
Putting aside the recent controversy about the replicability of some striking priming
effects, there can be little doubt that behavior can be subtly and irrationally primed. We have
focused on anchoring as a particularly well-documented illustration of this. However the
interpretation of such priming effects – and what they reveal about the mind and behavior – is
altogether less clear. A common viewpoint is that priming arises from the automatic and
unconscious activation of mental constructs, and that these constructs can have wide
influences on behavior. In our view a good portion of the current scepticism about priming is
based on dissatisfaction with this framework. Disbelief about the priming effects themselves
arises because, on alternative theoretical viewpoints, they appear implausible.
In the anchoring literature, researchers have marshalled evidence from studies of
subliminal, incidental, and cross-modal anchoring, and from experiments on the extent to
which individuals are or are not aware of and can or cannot control the influence of an
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anchor, to argue in support of this framework. An example is Morewedge and Kahneman’s
(2010) proposal that System 1, which carries out fast and automatic operations, is what drives
many anchoring effects. We have argued here that this interpretation of anchoring is not
strongly supported by the literature and is, indeed, in some respects contradicted by the
evidence. For example, individuals can intentionally control the influence of anchors
(Simmons et al., 2010) and have considerable insight into the extent to which anchors affect
their estimates (e.g., Wilson et al., 1996). Anchors are typically very narrow in their influence
across judgment dimensions, and from a Bayesian point-of-view the evidence for incidental
and cross-modal anchoring is at best inconclusive. We have evaluated the evidence in relation
to three of the four standard criteria for automaticity (Bargh, 1994; Moors & De Houwer,
2006), namely absence of awareness of the prime, absence of awareness of the prime’s effect
on one’s behaviour, and uncontrollability of the prime’s influence (the fourth criterion,
persistence of the prime’s influence even when cognitive resources are diminished, has
received very little attention in anchoring studies). On each criterion the evidence does not
support the idea that anchoring can occur automatically. It is not necessary, in sum, to accept
a dual-systems perspective in order to make sense of the varied phenomena associated with
anchoring. Instead, the general principles underlying deliberative (System 2) thought are
sufficient (Newell & Shanks, 2014; Shanks, 2007). On this alternative account, there are few
(if any) truly automatic or unconscious processes, nor is activation a passive and obligatory
phenomenon.
We acknowledge of course that anchoring is only one type of priming and that caution
is advised in extrapolating our conclusions to other, perhaps very different, forms of priming.
It is highly unlikely that there will turn out to be a single grand theory applicable to all forms
of priming; indeed, the term ‘anchoring’ itself refers to a range of phenomena that quite likely
depend on distinct mental processes. But despite this, anchoring encompasses two key
features that are central to other forms of priming: it occurs without deliberate intent, and
involves rich conceptual contents (e.g., magnitudes, semantic features) rather than narrow
mental constructs.
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. We are not the first to point out
that the incentive structures under which psychologists operate appear to discourage attempts
at replicating published results (Asendorpf et al., 2013) and that insufficient effort has been
devoted to replicating key results in experimental psychology (Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty,
2012; Simons, 2014). This is strikingly evident in the social cognition and anchoring fields.
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For example, it is very surprising that there have been no published attempts to replicate
Critcher and Gilovich’s (2008) demonstrations of incidental anchoring or Oppenheimer et
al.’s (2008) cross-modal anchoring effects. These (and other) findings are so important for
our theoretical understanding of anchoring that they cry out for further exploration. After all,
for many years it was almost universally accepted that accuracy motivation (induced by
financial incentives) usually fails to diminish anchoring, and it was only because Simmons et
al. (2010) undertook further replications of this phenomenon that they discovered that the
influence of anchors can in fact be attenuated and that the earlier conclusion was premature.
We urge researchers to place more emphasis on replication.
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